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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to contribute to an appreciation of 
the metaphilosophical significance of scepticism. It proceeds by 
investigating what the differing characterisations of the sceptical threat 
reveal about the kind of understanding that is being sought; and 
specifically, what this envisaged understanding connotes concerning 
how epistemological inquiry is itself conceived. An investigation, that is 
to say, into how these characterisations support or help constitute that 
conception of inquiry by attempting to keep a relationship with ‘the 
sceptic’ going on their own terms. 
Keywords: Metaphilosophy; Epistemological scepticism; Stroud; 
Sosa; Ancient scepticism. 
 
…scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which it may reflect on its 
dogmatical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region in 
which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater 
certainty; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It must take 
up its abode only in the region of complete certitude, whether this 
relates to the knowledge of objects themselves, or to the limits which 
bound all our knowledge. 
Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (A760/B788) 
I 
When the Hellenistic empiricists averred that all knowledge was derived from 
experience, it seemed natural to their ancient Sceptical opponents to wonder how 
they knew that to be the case. Since this was an assertion made by groups who had 
otherwise wildly divergent theories about the nature of existence and the form of the 
good life, it seemed equally natural to those Sceptics to ask how, on any particular 
occasion, the Dogmatist knew that an impression amounted to a genuine cognition. 
The Stoic Zeno made a game attempt to pre-empt certain developments in 
contemporary epistemology by claiming that a cognitive impression was such that it 
wouldn’t be the sort of perception it was, had it not arisen from what was clearly and 
distinctly taken as its object. Disdaining the Stoic’s internalism, Arcesilaus deployed 
examples to show that there didn’t appear to be a class of impressions that issued a 
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guarantee to the percipient that they couldn’t have arisen from any other object. 
Without a criterion of truth, the Stoics were left with no philosophical guide to the 
knowledge that would constitute the good life, and no obvious way of keeping the 
wolf from the porch. The significance of philosophical scepticism was that 
philosophy discovered its self-negating justification as an activity orientated towards 
the pursuit of the good life in its very failure to achieve that end through the 
acquisition of knowledge. 
Moving forwards a couple of thousand years, the motivation to understand 
human knowledge has undergone a certain modulation, and so has the perceived 
significance of philosophical scepticism. In his book of that name, Barry Stroud 
offers a picaresque account of 20th century philosophy’s failure to ward off the 
spectre of scepticism, ranging from Moore’s Quixotic gesticulations, through 
Carnap’s dismissively verificationist talk about idealist geographers, to Quine, 
threateningly brandishing the ‘big stick’ of naturalism. The significance of 
philosophical scepticism is the dilemma it poses:  
(SD)  If global sceptical doubt is rooted in a rather traditional and intuitively 
appealing concept of objectivity, and nothing the naturalistically-inclined 
philosopher has to say counts against it, then we cannot conclude that 
scientific epistemology exhausts the problem of knowledge. If, however, 
naturalism is right, then we cannot even formulate the sceptical problem, 
and that traditional conception must be rejected as erroneous. 
Perhaps more than anyone, Stroud has contributed to the sense that the 
epistemologist’s relationship with the sceptic is paradoxical: he can’t live with her, 
but it seems he can’t live without her either. As we all know, in such relationships the 
customary outcome is a growing desire on the part of one or other of the partners to 
want to change the other—a sure sign that things just aren’t going to work out in the 
long run. Counselling aside, there is a genuine diagnostic point here. Its significance 
can be missed, however, because that way of expressing the paradox threatens to 
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miss part of the story: it makes it appear as if scepticism is just a formal challenge to 
a particular sort of theoretical enterprise, one which has a figure like Descartes or 
Kant insulating itself from its Hellenistic forebears in the knowledge game1. From 
this perspective, the failure to understand human knowledge in general might be 
likened to the failure to come up with a unified theory in physics—an intellectual 
disappointment to some, but hardly likely to make much impact on common life. 
Nevertheless, the feeling lingers that this isn’t quite right; that despite its 
technicalities, epistemology is engaged in a different sort of inquiry, the failure of 
which betokens more than a mere disappointment with theory. Stroud’s response to 
Michael Williams’ (1991) theoretical diagnosis evokes this intuition: 
The enterprise I find most interesting really amounts to reflection on a 
certain kind of human reflection… what goes on when humans reflect 
on themselves in the ways we have become familiar with in Western 
philosophy[?]… how are the absurd or paradoxical conclusions of those 
reflections to be understood? … If we cannot accept them… we must 
find some way in which the philosophical reflection goes wrong or 
misleads us… I think reflection on this kind of reflection can be 
expected to reveal something interesting and deep about human 
aspirations… (Stroud 1996: 347-8) 
On this understanding, then, philosophical scepticism does not pose a merely 
formal problem but roots itself in the phenomenological or perhaps even existential 
features of (at least historical; at least ‘our’) human experience. Not everyone will 
share Stroud’s intuition here, and Stroud is himself not very clear about its import. 
Nevertheless, at least one element of it is widely acknowledged these days, and that 
despite a general decline of interest in therapy-cum-quietism; namely, that some 
account of how aberrant, pathological or non-ordinary thinking takes place has to be 
given if we are to come up with a satisfactory response to the sceptic. A second 
                                                   
1 See Burnyeat and Frede 1997 for the significance of the debate about the differences 
between modern and ancient scepticism. 
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element is related but more contentious. In the form of a (longish) question one 
might ask just how extensive or fundamental is this experience; and what 
implications does it have for understanding human beings in general and for an 
individual’s self-understanding? It is this sort of concern that, if it persists, links the 
contemporary significance of philosophical scepticism to what it had for the Greeks.  
If we think about the theoretical/formal and the phenomenological/existential 
as two axes along which to locate possible interpretations of the challenge of 
scepticism it helps make a little sense of the fact that philosophers who collectively 
claim to be interested in it can find themselves in stark disagreement about what 
exactly it is. Michael Williams, for example, repeatedly warns us against confusing 
philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy. The former presents a 
radical challenge to our “self-image as (potentially) rational animals” (1999: 143) by 
questioning the legitimacy of the concept of justification; the latter merely serves to 
remind us that if our epistemological hubris carries us too far away from the 
concerns of common life, we’ll cease to find the sceptic’s doubt about knowledge 
causes us any anxiety. By way of contrast, in the mid-1990s Ernest Sosa published a 
number of articles in which he defended the possibility of a “fully general theory of 
knowledge” against what he calls philosophical scepticism (1994: 263). For Sosa, the 
failure to oppose this leaves our—presumably philosophically informed—worldview 
vulnerable to the debilitations of modern culture, with its irrational cults of 
ethnocentrism and relativism (ibid.: 290). 
We will return to Sosa in section four of this paper but it’s worth remarking 
the lip service both pay to the idea that scepticism is related to philosophy through 
the latter’s association with a desire for some sort of understanding. This could of 
course relate to an individual’s reflective self-understanding; or to the understanding 
‘we’ philosophers have of what creatures like ‘us’ (and through that ourselves) are or 
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are not capable of; or indeed, to either of these applied not to the individual but to 
‘our’ culture as a whole.  In that light, the aim of this paper is to investigate what the 
differing characterisations of the sceptical threat reveal about the kind of 
understanding that is being sought; and specifically, what this envisaged 
understanding connotes concerning how epistemological inquiry is itself conceived. 
An investigation, that is to say, into how these characterisations support or help 
constitute that conception of inquiry (how some epistemological theories attempt to 
keep a relationship with the sceptic going on their own terms). In doing so, the aim is 
to contribute to an appreciation of what might be called the metaphilosophical 
significance of scepticism.  
In the next section I’ll dramatise sceptical doubt in terms of a paradox that 
aims to capture something of the phenomenological appeal of sceptical thinking. 
Against this background I’ll then introduce three variations on the all-too-familiar 
closure-based argument for scepticism and relate them to an insight central to 
Thompson Clarke’s ‘The Legacy of Skepticism’ (Clarke 1972). This is intended to 
provide a context, as it were, for a discussion of some familiar externalist responses 
to the sceptical argument in section three. My purpose here will be to show what 
these approaches reveal about the motivation behind and likely success of 
restrictively characterising the sceptical threat; and in the penultimate section I’ll 
apply the insight gained thereby to Sosa’s attempt to address what he understands as 
the unrestricted challenge of scepticism. Surprisingly, that will take us back to the 
ancient Greeks. 
II 
When we left our Stoic empiricist he was aiming to establish a criterion that would 
allow him to distinguish between a genuine cognition and one that merely appeared 
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to arise from its purported object. The contemporary philosopher, who believes that 
at least our knowledge of spatio-temporal objects comes from the use of the senses, 
likewise examines a particular occasion when the conditions attending such use 
might be thought optimal and as a consequence that what we (for example) see 
justifies our perceptual knowledge. In the first Meditation Descartes has us run 
through a number of ancient sceptical possibilities to the effect that particular things 
might not be as they appear before introducing alternative possible explanations that 
are in-principle ineliminable from the standpoint the percipient takes themselves to 
occupy in common life. Against the backdrop of this concern with justification, the 
contemporary problem emerges; namely, that since these possibilities are 
ineliminable from that standpoint, it is difficult to see how, on this evaluation of the 
status of what we experience, we could know what we think we know. 
This is not the end of the matter of course, for once these possibilities have 
been introduced it is not obvious what sort of evidence might be offered in response. 
Clearly nothing derivable from experience could suffice, but a non-empirical 
conception of evidence suggests a domain of discourse that is to some degree or 
other distinct from the empirical. This bumps the problem of justification up a level 
and leaves us with a further problem; namely, that whilst practical doubt can trouble 
us precisely because it is naturally limited by the exigencies of life, philosophical 
doubt carries no conviction whatsoever from the standpoint of our practical dealings 
with the world, and so the latter offers no constraint on possible responses to the 
former. 
This apparent tension between the philosophical standpoint that leads to 
sceptical doubts and the engaged standpoint of common life that is seemingly 
insulated from them can be expressed in the following propositions: 
(T1) In common life we are able to reflect on a particular empirical belief and ask 
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if we are justified in believing it. 
(T2) Sceptical doubts arise naturally when we take up a philosophical standpoint 
on common life and ask how our knowledge is possible. 
(T3) Philosophical doubt carries no conviction from the standpoint of common 
life and yet this does not warrant its rejection, which leaves us with the 
suspicion that scepticism does after all reveal something about our ordinary 
epistemic practices. 
(T3) expresses what I’ll call the Original Sceptical Paradox. It captures the 
phenomenological pull that characterises the apparent naturalness of the transition 
from (T1) to (T2). This confronts the non-sceptic with two related concerns—the 
Intuition Problem and the Quietist Dilemma. The Intuition Problem relates to the 
requirement that one demonstrate that there’s something illusory about the 
suspicion that the transition from (T1) to (T2) reveals something important about 
our cognitive predicament. The Quietist Dilemma draws attention to the fact that 
however that demonstration proceeds, it cannot impose a settlement that is less 
intuitively appealing than the thinking that leads to the problem in the first place. 
Although the problem of scepticism is not always posed in these 
phenomenological terms, the Quietist Dilemma and the Intuition Problem give us an 
axis along which to evaluate the varying strategies that have been advanced to ‘deal’ 
with it. The logical positivist, for example, can directly dissolve the tension in (T3) by 
adverting to a semantic theory that stipulates that the ‘engaged’ standpoint of 
practical ‘verification’ provides the sole criterion of meaningfulness. In Skepticism 
and Naturalism Strawson (1985) draws upon the lack of conviction to set ‘natural’ 
limits on the movement of thought from (T1) to (T2), and thereby prevent our having 
to address the conflict in (T3). Similarly, Rorty glosses ‘carries no conviction’ as 
“makes no difference to practice” (1998: 19), and sanctions an outright dismissal of 
(T3) on the grounds that only someone who has read too much Descartes would find 
the transition from (T1) to (T2) compelling in the first place. 
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The failure of the positivist approach is a good illustration of the challenge 
posed by the Quietist Dilemma. At the same time, many would sympathise with 
McDowell’s observation that debunking philosophical problems fails because it does 
not ease our sense of “philosophical discomfort” (1994: 142, fn. 17)2. The discomfort 
comes in part because ‘we’ want to understand for ourselves the solution to the 
Intuition Problem, not simply be told that it isn’t a real problem if we take up one or 
other of these metaphilosophical recommendations. Indeed, they seem far less 
appealing intuitively than the problem they are contrived in response to. And one 
reason we want a response to the Intuition Problem is that it makes a very familiar 
argument seem unavoidable. Instead of one version, here are three: 
V1. The plain 
argument3 
 
V2. The philosophical-
plain argument 
V3. The philosophical 
argument 
S doesn’t knowpl that ~sp 
 
S doesn’t knowph that ~sp 
 
S doesn’t knowph that 
~rmt/~sp 
 
If S knowspl that 
q/material objects exist 
then S knowspl that ~sp 
If S knowspl that 
q/material objects exist 
then S knowsph that ~sp 
 
 
If S knowsph that material 
objects exist/q then S 
knowsph that ~rmt/~sp 
S doesn’t knowpl that 
q/material objects exist 
S doesn’t knowpl that 
q/material objects exist 
S doesn’t knowph that 
material objects objects 
exist/q 
 
The argument is presented in this way in order to schematise the suggestion that the 
metaphilosophical issue is how the epistemologist conceives of the sceptical 
possibilities; specifically, with the sort of ‘knowing’ that is associated with them. As 
such it draws on Thomson Clarke’s seminal ‘The Legacy of Skepticism’ (1972). Given 
                                                   
2 McDowell is commenting specifically on Rorty’s work here. 
3 Where ph and pl are short for philosophical and plain respectively, q stands for any 
empirical propositon, sp refers to the usual sceptical possibilities, and rmt to a 
revisionary metaphysical thesis like being a monad. 
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its influence on Stroud and the renewed interest in Moore4 that seems doubly 
appropriate. In ‘Legacy,’ then, Clarke aims to defend Moore by arguing that his proof 
can indeed be regarded as non-circular if there is a genuine doubt motivating the 
claim that one does not know that external objects exist—a doubt that Moore can 
eliminate when he holds up his hands. To that end Clarke introduces the distinction 
between the plain and the philosophical possibility that one might be dreaming. The 
upshot of his argument5 is that built into the plain possibility that each of us right 
now might be dreaming is a commitment to knowledge of the external world. When 
the philosophical possibility is entered, however, the sceptic characterises perceptual 
knowledge in a specific way—one that assumes in effect that there is some ‘mark’ or 
‘feature’ of experience (some criterion) that would allow us to rule out all the 
alternative possibilities to a knowledge claim. According to this picture the plain is 
restrictively characterized by the need to ignore certain distant possibilities on 
pragmatic grounds; knowledge per se, however, is the infallibilist’s invulnerability of 
belief to doubt. However, this philosophical possibility is held to be reflexively 
unstable because it presupposes the intelligibility of something—a criterion in 
experience—the possibility of which it denies (since one’s experience is taken by 
hypothesis to be such that one could never come to know that one is not dreaming)6. 
As a consequence Clarke draws two important conclusions: firstly, that the 
philosophical possibility doesn’t make sense; and secondly, that since the plain 
dream possibility clearly does make sense, perceptual knowledge cannot be 
understood on the ‘mark’ and ‘feature’ model presupposed by the sceptic. 
                                                   
4 For a summary of Neo-Moorean thought see Pritchard 2007. 
5 For more on Clarke see Gascoigne 2007. 
6 As Clarke has it, “The Philosophical possibility therefore, of necessity, calls in 
question (negates) the very knowing it presupposes” (ibid.: 765).  
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It should be clear from the foregoing how Clarke’s neo-Moorean strategy 
relates to the Original Sceptical Paradox and to the above classification of arguments. 
The implication is that the transition from (T1) to (T2) that generates the Intuition 
Problem depends on an unwarranted and ultimately self-defeating restriction of the 
plain from the philosophical standpoint—the standpoint of the philosophical 
sceptical possibilities. Having eliminated these possibilities we are can resist the 
temptation to be drawn from version (V1) to version (V2) of the argument and are 
free to take our knowledge that external objects exist as an item of plain knowing. To 
repeat, this will not be plain knowing as it was conceived of in opposition to the 
philosophical knowledge promised by the philosophical possibility—it would be plain 
knowing according to which the plain sceptical possibility is known to be false—
though not in the way that was originally conceived (on the ‘criterial’ model7). 
Although this is not the time to trace the influence of Clarke’s work, it is worth 
noting how it relates to (SD). Consider the following conditional: 
(CC) if the traditional concept of objectivity is fully intelligible, then philosophical 
scepticism is correct (and we can’t show how knowledge is possible). 
Clarke denies the consequent and concludes that the plain must be rethought in such 
a way that the traditional epistemological project makes no sense; Stroud rejects 
Clarke’s verificationist dismissal of the meaning of the philosophical possibility and 
thus keeps open the possibility that one can consider the traditional epistemological 
project both philosophically possible and plainly impossible.  
If it is indeed the case that the philosophical possibility is not meaningless, we 
cannot in that way prevent the seemingly destructive transition from version (V1) to 
                                                   
7 In this respect there are clear parallels between Clarke’s conception of knowledge 
and disjunctivism. For an evaluation of the latter see Haddock and Macpherson 
2008.  
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version (V2) of the argument. Nevertheless, Clarke gives us a hint as to how we might 
go about doing this, and that suggestion coheres nicely with the turn that 
epistemology was taking around that time. The hint, then, is that perceptual 
knowledge is not to be understood on the model of the plain that is stipulated from 
the standpoint of philosophical doubt—an internalist model according to which there 
has to be a criterion in experience that would allow us to rule out all the alternative 
possibilities to what we take to be the case. The challenge is to limit those 
possibilities—and thus insulate the plain from the philosophical—while learning the 
apparent lesson neglected by Clarke; namely, that since the philosophical possibility 
cannot be rejected as meaningless, version (V2) of the argument cannot be 
straightforwardly avoided. The task, then, is to formulate a conception of the 
sceptical threat that underwrites the possibility of some version of the traditional 
epistemological project without at the same time making it seem impossible to 
complete. So let’s see if that can be done. 
III 
At first blush it might appear that this talk of philosophical sceptical possibilities is 
an odd way of putting it because in contemporary epistemology the sceptical 
possibilities are rarely thought of in this way—after all, it is naturalistic epistemology 
we’re talking about, and the last thing such an epistemologist wants is a supernatural 
opponent. Dretske’s well-known relevance-invariantism (1970), for example, aims to 
motivate the failure of closure by claiming that the alternatives relevant to knowing 
that something is not a painted mule are disjunctive from those relevant to knowing 
that something is a zebra. On this account, the sceptical possibility is clearly 
envisaged as a plain possibility, not a philosophical one. With Clarke’s piece in view 
we might say that Dretske has learned the lesson that if one is to avoid scepticism 
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one cannot stipulate a criterial (internalist) model of knowing—one consonant with 
the Stoic’s search for a cognitive impression. One is not required to have to be able to 
discriminate in one’s experience between a zebra-experience and a painted-mule-
experience. There are of course well-known criticisms to the effect that closure does 
hold here—that an agent’s grounds for believing that something is a zebra are 
grounds for believing it’s not a painted-mule. And from a Clarkean perspective one 
can see why this would be the case: the limit of plain knowing is not actually 
characterised by the non-necessity of being able to discriminate between a zebra and 
a painted-mule. Rather, it is characterised by the requirement that one can 
discriminate between a painted-mule-experience, a zebra-hologram, zebra-
animatronics and the like (though not of course just by looking). In other words, an 
internalist requirement for evidence or a criterion in experience frames the 
externalist restriction on plain-knowing. 
The significance of this structural problem becomes clearer when we turn to 
how the case against closure is intended to work against real sceptical possibilities. 
Imagine that in Vatland there is a long-established and regular and widespread 
practice of envatting brains for brief periods of time. Usually people do it when they 
plan a break from the intramundane, but one can imagine that from time to time 
some jokester thinks it a wheeze to have his friend find himself naked on stage at 
Covent Garden, and certain government agencies might have more malevolent 
intentions. If this were an empirical practice one wouldn’t use the threat of it to call 
into question the possibility of perceptual knowledge; nor fail in general to know that 
one was not an envatted brain—though one would not of course know it because on 
any occasion one merely inspects a perceptual experience and sees that it does or 
does not clearly and distinctly arise from the object it is taken to be of. Indeed, this is 
simply the brain-in-a-vat equivalent of Clarke’s plain dream; the question is, is it 
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what Dretske has in mind? I think the answer has to be no—the denial of closure only 
works if the alternatives relevant to being a brain-in-a-vat differ from cases of plain 
knowing and it is not at all clear that this is the case here. Moreover, the alternatives 
form disjunctive classes precisely because of the stipulation that one would not know 
that one was not a brain-in-a-vat. That is to say, the assumption is that there could 
be a criterion but that it is in principle denied us in experience—which is how Clarke 
characterises the philosophically restricted plain. 
On this account, then, being a brain-in-a-vat is not a plain possibility but a 
philosophical possibility and the alternatives relevant to that sort of knowing include 
any sort of revisionary metaphysical claim like—say—being a monad! This suggests 
that when one offers a restricted conception of the plain from the philosophical, one 
introduces a kind of knowing—the kind that would constitute the knowledge that 
sceptical possibilities are false—that requires an internally accessible criterion. And 
yet it seems impossible to imagine possessing such a thing from the standpoint of the 
plain. Indeed, to possess it would presumably constitute a philosophical 
understanding of how knowledge is possible. The problem this raises is that if we can 
indeed imagine what a criterion of this sort would look like, it is not clear why we 
should deny its relevance to plain knowing. After all—as Descartes might point out—
if we do have an a priori demonstration that god would not allow our clear and 
distinct ideas to mislead us how could we then regard that as irrelevant to our plain 
knowing? Restricting the plain is such a way that no response to the sceptic is 
possible whilst simultaneously keeping open the fact that it is nevertheless 
intelligible seems purpose made to reinforce the grip of the Intuition Problem and 
the Original Sceptical Paradox. That is to say, one finds that version (V1) of the 
argument collapses into version (V2) and thence (V3). 
The lack of resources that relevance-invariantism gives us for dealing with the 
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Intuition Problem is itself a strong motivation for what is regarded by many as a 
successor theory; namely relevance-contextualism. In its attributive form this allows 
that the transition from (T1) to (T2) does indeed have a phenomenological 
foundation in a natural feature of language use but denies that this has implications 
for our plain knowing8. The point then is that since the context in which sceptical 
possibilities are raised is one in which we don’t in fact plainly know, the apparent 
tension in (T3) is dissolved. Since intra-contextual closure is retained but inter-
contextual closure denied, we have version (2) of the argument. That is to say, the 
disjunction is between the set of alternatives relevant to plain knowing and that 
relevant to the denial of sceptical possibilities. 
What then are we to make of these sceptical possibilities? As we saw with the 
relevance-invariantist, empirical possibilities like confronting a painted mule are not 
analogous to those associated with philosophical scepticism. By retaining intra-
contextual closure and thereby acknowledging that one can non-criterially know the 
denials of (plain) sceptical hypotheses, the relevance-contextualist extends the realm 
of the plain along the lines indicated by Clarke. That is to say, in plain knowing we 
know the plain sceptical possibility to be false, and our knowledge is not dependent 
on the identification of a criterion in experience. As Stewart Cohen (2000) for one 
admits, there is of course a concern with this sort of knowing—it has the hallmark of 
contingent a priori knowledge. Putting that to one side for just a moment, the more 
immediate problem is that like Dretske (and unlike Clarke) the relevance-
contextualist cannot or at least does not stop here: this account of plain knowing is 
contrasted with the type of knowing that characterises the denials of non-plain 
                                                   
8 Perhaps in its purest form one can simply recall the changing evaluation one makes 
of one’s own epistemic position as one runs through the arguments of the first 
Meditation. 
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sceptical possibilities—a sort of knowing that suggests the possibility of a criterion 
that experience could never in principle furnish. 
Clearly, then, the experience of shifts within empirical contexts is as 
disanalogous in relation to the contrast between philosophical doubt and plain doubt 
as the painted-mule possibility. Again, the externalist account of plain knowing is 
bought at the expense of an implied criterion, the satisfaction of which would 
constitute an (internalist) understanding of how human knowledge is possible. While 
this stands so does the suspicion that the failure to eliminate the philosophical 
possibilities exposes something about plain knowing. With this in mind we can 
return to Cohen’s invocation of that strangely-familiar category of knowledge (the 
contingent a priori) and offer advice in the form of a variation on a familiar gnome: 
only the transcendental idealist can be a relevance-contextualist. 
What the shift from relevance-invariantism to relevance-contextualism shows, 
I think, is the need for what the neo-Moorean Clarke wanted all along: an 
understanding of plain-knowing that is not formulated from a position outside it. 
Otherwise the sceptic, as he says, will continue to “have one foot within the 
philosophical, the other within the plain” (Clarke 1972: 767-8)—and what better way 
of describing the contingent a priori? The problem is that by keeping the 
philosophical possibilities open we retain the possibility of a view of the plain from 
something contrasted with it and that induces the temptation to want to see 
ourselves as knowing what we think we know—having a philosophical understanding 
of human knowledge. To put it in less Clarkean terms, the desire to formulate an 
externalist theory of plain knowing seems to merely relocate the problem of 
scepticism at the level of philosophical knowledge—at the level of scepticism about 
philosophy. 
What is noteworthy about this is not the failure of externalist attempts to deal 
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with scepticism but the thought that they might succeed in the first place, and here I 
have a rather speculative diagnosis. What makes the traditional argument appear 
compelling is that seemingly we cannot justify our plain beliefs because experience 
affords no criterion that allows us to discriminate between being awake and—say—
being envatted. That is what motivates the claim that we don’t know that we’re not 
brains-in-vats. At the end of section 2 reference was made to the turn epistemology 
was making around the time of Clarke’s piece; that is to say, to the attempts, post-
Gettier, to formulate an externalist account of knowledge—an account that in 
Clarke’s terms would not suppose the criterial model of experience that seems to 
make scepticism unanswerable. Internalist objections aside, then, an analysis of 
knowledge that resolved Gettier problems promised to offer simultaneously the key 
to a solution to scepticism. And that coincidence seems particularly rewarding since 
the constructive epistemologist needs some criterion for success. Offering a solution 
to scepticism has the weight of tradition on its side, and is certainly preferable to 
waiting around in fear of yet another counterexample! 
The promise, then, was an analysis of knowledge that did not suppose 
internalist justification and consequently allowed that we know that we’re not brains-
in-vats. But in order to know that we’re not brains-in-vats there has to be the 
possibility of not-knowing—there has to be an alternative. In the traditional sceptical 
story that alternative is formulated in terms of the philosophical possibilities, which 
rest on our ability to see ourselves both from the inside and from the outside—have 
one foot within the plain and the other within the philosophical. But that opposition 
is not open to us if we are externalists since that makes our not knowing a question of 
not being internalistically justified. If the opposition between knowing and not-
knowing is to be retained an alternative standpoint is required. 
Now what Gettier-style examples do is use a story to set up a situational 
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asymmetry in order to tap into one’s intuitions about when it is rational to attribute 
knowledge to someone. As such, they depend on one’s capacity to think oneself into a 
situation whilst remaining reflectively or self-consciously aware that that is not one’s 
‘real’ situation. Despite the fact that ‘we’ conclude that Smith does or does not know, 
the fact that Smith in general possesses knowledge is never in doubt; and neither is 
the knowledge of what we might call the Gettier Interpreter (since they are both 
ourselves).  
Now recall that what motivates Dretske’s response to scepticism is an analogy 
with painted mule cases. Likewise, the relevance-contextualist is impressed by the 
way mere conversational factors can alter our willingness to attribute knowledge to a 
subject. The opposition between the knower and non-knower in these cases appears 
to have the same structure as for the Gettier Interpreter. Accordingly, the externalist 
response to scepticism imposes a structure of knowing/non-knowing that is derived 
from the Gettier examples and which characterises the relationship between the 
epistemologist and the sceptic in strictly theoretical or formal terms. In the case of 
relevance-invariantism and relevance-contextualism, however, this gives rise to a 
certain ambiguity: the sceptical possibilities cannot be dismissed as meaningless 
because they cannot even be formulated in externalist terms and so we have the 
residual need for an internalist criterion of philosophical knowledge. In both cases 
we feel the residuum of the existential interpretation of the relationship between 
scepticism and human knowledge9. 
To conclude this section, then, one might say that if the attempt to restrict the 
sceptical threat is successful, it leaves epistemology ‘hovering’, to use Edward Craig’s 
                                                   
9 In its purest neo-Moorean form, externalism embraces the idea that the sceptical 
possibilities have no bearing on plain knowing but leaves us unable to meaningfully 
raise the question of how we know –the philosophical question. 
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phrase—“not submitting itself to enough constraints to count as really being about 
anything much” (2000: 665). Although motivated by different interests, Sosa (2000) 
makes a similar complaint about relevance-contextualism: 
Supposing epistemic vocabulary to be correctly applicable in contexts 
that set a different threshold from that of epistemological inquiry, how 
relevant can that be to epistemological questions about the nature, 
conditions, and extent of human knowledge? (ibid.: 2) 
Now I’ve proceeded on the basis that the naturalistically-inclined philosopher is 
inadvertently dependent on an internalist criterion in order to formulate their 
externalism—that is to say, that a commitment to some sort of non-
empirical/philosophical knowledge or understanding of human knowledge is 
required. This is to understand the philosophical significance of scepticism in a 
different way. Accordingly, a philosophical understanding of human knowledge is 
relevant to ordinary claims, as suggested by the transition from (T1) to (T2), and as 
such is linked up with the existential dimension of the sceptical threat. Of course one 
response here would be to accept that to avoid scepticism we need a philosophical 
understanding of ‘the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge’ but deny 
that this presupposes that the criterion of such knowing must be construed 
internalistically. Can externalist be understood in this way? This question brings us 
back to Sosa, so let’s see if he continues to ‘hover’ or comes crashing down to earth. 
IV 
In ‘Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity’10 Sosa takes up the question 
whether an externalist theory of knowledge could reasonably explain its own status 
as a knowledge claim. The implied problem adverts to a form of scepticism that 
predates the version of the argument we’ve been officially considering; namely, to the 
                                                   
10 This is a response of sorts to Stroud 1989. 
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Modes of Agrippa and the seemingly devastating conclusion that any attempt to 
justify a claim that q threatens a regress of reason-giving. Since the demand for 
reasons presupposes their availability to the putative knower, epistemological 
externalism offers a by-now familiar way out. A theory of knowledge that presented a 
satisfactory analysis of Gettier problems and hopefully answered the sceptic would 
prevent the regress from unfolding. Since this is a constructive solution, however, the 
problem now shifts to the next level—the status of the theory of knowledge that 
shows that knowing doesn’t require access to reasons. Recalling the structure of 
Gettier problems, one has to divide-and-unify oneself in a particularly novel way—be 
able to see oneself as one’s own Gettier Interpreter. In doing so, one squeezes out as 
it were the desire or possibility of raising for oneself the question of the justification 
of one’s own theory—the possibility that there might be relevant ineliminable 
alternatives. 
This is how Sosa lays out his bold (“Radical”) argument: 
(A1) Any theory of knowledge must be internalist or externalist. 
(A2) A fully general internalist theory is impossible. 
(A3) A fully general externalist theory is impossible. 
(C) From (A1)-(A3), philosophical scepticism follows. (ibid.: 93-94) 
Where philosophical scepticism is defined as: 
There is no way to attain full philosophical understanding of our 
knowledge. A fully general theory of knowledge is impossible. (ibid.: 
93) 
Defining internalists as those who hold “that a belief can be justified and amount to 
knowledge only through the backing of reasons or arguments” (ibid. 94), Sosa claims 
that they can only conceive of a ‘fully general theory of knowledge’ as a legitimating 
account of knowledge. According to such a conception, justification must be in terms 
of reasons and arguments that do not fall foul of circularity or regress. However: 
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It is impossible to attain a legitimating account of absolutely all one’s 
knowledge… since it rules out circular or endlessly regressive 
inferences, such an account must stop with premises that it supposes 
without explaining how one is justified in accepting them in turn. 
(ibid.: 96) 
Since it suggests (A2) is true, the only way to resist Sosa’s sceptic is to show that (A3) 
is false; namely, that a fully general externalist theory is possible. The assumption, 
then, is that a ‘full philosophical understanding of our knowledge’ can be achieved 
without being a legitimating account of knowledge. 
Before continuing it’s worth noting a couple of things. Firstly, Sosa’s 
argument is the sort of preliminary that would lead to the formulation of version (3) 
of our original argument. Just as our failure to be able discriminate—to find a 
criterion—in experience warrants the conclusion that we don’t know that we’re 
envatted, so the conclusion of Sosa’s argument warrants the minor premise in (3)11. 
Secondly, despite the familiarity of the setting, Sosa’s sceptic is not an ancient 
Sceptic. She would never be so vulgar as to draw the conclusion that a fully general 
theory of knowledge is impossible—on the contrary, her role would be restricted to 
pointing out inconsistencies in and conflicts between Dogmatic theories of 
knowledge. No successful theory has yet been forthcoming but hey-ho! we can 
nevertheless go on searching. Finally, by Sosa’s own lights, if the externalist account 
of knowledge does not amount to a ‘full philosophical understanding’, Sosa’s sceptic 
is correct—again, a conclusion the ancient Sceptic can note dialectically. 
How then to proceed? Ruling out internalism, the externalist has three 
possible way of accounting for how a belief acquires the status of knowledge: 
Coherentism, Foundationalism of the given, and Reliablism. Dispensing quickly with 
the first two, Sosa concludes that the latter is the only runner: 
                                                   
11 I.e. that we don’t knowph that philosophical scepticism (in this case an 
epistemological position) is false.  
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When a belief is epistemically justified, it is so in virtue of deriving 
from an epistemically, truth-conducively reliable process or intellectual 
virtue of belief acquisition. (ibid.: 96) 
Since Sosa’s paper is being evaluated with a specific question for the externalist in 
mind, we can skip the details of the his account and recall it, suitably adapted to his 
presentation: Could Sosa have good reasons for thinking that his reliabilist theory is 
true without being able or wanting to legitimate it in the light of that desideratum? 
Well, in an obvious sense, yes. Sosa has good reasons to believe that his reliabilist 
theory is true if he came to acquire that belief in accordance with the details of his 
theory. It should be noted that no one has come up with such a theory and 
internalists have offered Gettier-type examples that demonstrate the difficulty of 
formulating one. Nevertheless, if such a theory R were finally arrived at it would 
presumably be because someone had—finally! After 2500 years!—acquired the 
necessary ‘intellectual virtue’. As Sosa states—and here the Sceptic would be churlish 
(not to say Dogmatic) to disagree: 
there is no obstacle in principle to our conceivable attaining rationally 
coherent belief in some general account of our own epistemic faculties 
and their reliablity… [and] attain thereby a general understanding of 
how we know whatever we know. (ibid.: 108)  
In his response to Sosa’s paper, Stroud (1994) accepts the foregoing (in principle) 
and suggests the following. Whilst we can understand how S knows that R is correct, 
what are we to make of our own position? Surely our sense of ourselves as knowers 
must play a role in any attempt at a philosophical understanding of knowledge. 
Imagining ourselves in S’s position, we could reach the following conditional: 
(SC) If R is true and I acquired my belief that R in accordance with R then I have 
good reasons to believe that R. 
Of course, I do believe R is correct, and because I believe it is correct I do hold myself 
to have good reasons for believing it—reasons provided by R. But, observes Stroud, is 
this the kind of philosophical understanding we aim for? Is it not reasonable, or even 
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responsible, of me to ask myself over and above this whether I really do understand 
how knowledge is possible? And this despite the fact that, viewed from the third 
person, if as I believe R is true then I have the all the reasons there are? For Stroud 
what’s missing is the fact that: 
the goal of understanding how we know what we do does require that 
the successful account be ‘legitimating’ at least in the sense of enabling 
us to understand that what we have got is knowledge of, or reasonable 
belief in, the world’s being a certain way. (ibid.: 302) 
The way in which this seems particularly pressing is precisely when it comes to 
reflecting on the status of our philosophical accounts—the results of so much 
intellectual labour; especially when we are confronted not only with the 
contemporary disagreement of our peers, but with that impressive history of what 
the externalist can only judge as the ‘failure’ to have acquired the reliable intellectual 
virtues. We can therefore extend Stroud’s criticism and suggest that the recognition 
of legitimation is indeed present in Sosa’s view—though not in a way he’d find 
conducive. Since in order to know there has to be the possibility of not knowing, let’s 
return to S’s perceived lack and ask a further question: what would lead S not to 
reflect in the above way? 
A very brief excursus may be in order here. When we left our Stoic, Arcesilaus 
had suggested that no perceptions appeared such that one could discount their not 
having arisen from something other than their purported object. Now the Stoic did 
have a response to this; namely, that only the ignorant would make such a mistake. 
The Stoic Sage has acquired the discipline-cum-wisdom required to ensure that he 
only ever assents to impressions that are genuinely cognitive. What supports this is 
the distinction between knowledge proper—episteme—and mere cognition 
(katalepsis). Cognition relates to being in the right epistemic context; episteme, on 
the other hand, relates only to those who exercise the maximal level of cognitive 
 23 
responsibility by having brought their own nature into accordance with nature as a 
whole. Let’s say that anyone who possesses knowledge proper satisfies the Full 
Competency Requirement. Any S can claim that if I am a Sage, then I satisfy the Full 
Competency Requirement and have knowledge proper; but only a Sage would know 
that the antecedent were true. 
With that in mind, let’s return to the question—why wouldn’t S believe that 
they might be mistaken? The answer is that S would have to satisfy the Full 
Competency Requirement. Only someone who had acquired the intellectual virtues 
that enabled them to recognise R as accounting for the process by which they came 
to believe R would not reflect in the way Stroud suggests, and find the account 
legitimating. Equally, anyone deficient in those virtues would lack good reasons to 
believe R and detect an absence of legitimation by their ability to consider alternative 
theoretical possibilities. Indeed, given that the processes by which those who believe 
R with good reasons are the same processes that enable them to have knowledge per 
se, maybe only the externalist heir of the Stoic Sage and who satisfies the Full 
Competency Requirement would have knowledge at all. Let’s call anyone in such a 
position of cognitive legitimation the Sosa-Sage! 
V 
I began by linking Stroud’s sceptical dilemma to a tension between two ways of 
construing the sceptical threat—the formal or theoretical and the existential. This 
paper has attempted to dramatise a retreat from the attempt to restrict scepticism to 
a merely theoretical problem by trying to show that what makes it possible is an 
implicit commitment to a different way of understanding of human knowledge—an 
understanding that one might regard as philosophical in character, and which has 
been associated with the existential interpretation of scepticism. With Sosa we found 
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an acknowledgement of this obligation; albeit one structured by the same externalist 
approach to naturalising our understanding of human knowledge. The association of 
Sosa with the aspirations of the Stoics wasn’t merely to afford the opportunity for a 
bad pun—by raising the question of the reflexive stability of an account of 
philosophical knowledge Sosa echoes the concerns of those ancient Dogmatists, and 
it seemed only apt to return to the contemporary stage their Sceptical foes. 
Whatever changes the significance scepticism has for philosophy has 
undergone, a tenuous link remains with what is common to the thought of the 
ancient Sceptics, Descartes and Hume—the role it plays in the articulation of a 
certain sort of reflective understanding—an understanding of what ‘we’ are; or at the 
very least what we are not. If the ‘we’ no longer refers to ‘we’ philosophers, let alone 
‘we’ Westerners or we human beings then that link disappears. Let’s therefore end on 
Sceptical note. If Sosa has indeed achieved the state of being a Sage he should of 
course be wished well—there are few enough signs of wisdom in this age of ours. But 
what is clear is that if he has the understanding of human knowledge that consists in 
being in that state it won’t be by virtue of his knowing a theory. And so like Socratic 
wisdom it therefore won’t be directly communicable to others. 
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